The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the post-Second World War international organizations set up to promote good international economic cooperation among states. Unlike international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (which succeeded the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947), decision-making in the IMF is quite peculiar in that it is based on the joint stock company model where the value of shares determine the value of a member's vote. Thus the principle of sovereign equality of states that underpins the one-member-one-vote system in the UN and WTO is absent in the IMF. This paper discusses the various decisionmaking organs in the IMF and concludes with a discussion on the sovereignty implications of the use of IMF conditionalities in the giving of loans, especially to developing countries.
Introduction
The IMF, like the UN and the GATT/WTO systems, has its founding roots in World War II and the need to promote international cooperation among states [1] . The effect of the Great Depression of the 1930s on the breakdown of international economic relations and its possible contribution to the outbreak of World War II is a well-documented occurrence in world history [2] . The need to build international multilateral institutions to instil global economic stability to avert a recurrence of the Great Depression was one of the main objectives that culminated in the founding of the so called Bretton Woods Institutions -the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (more popularly known as the World Bank) [3] . The IMF and its sister organisation, the World Bank, were the products of the Bretton Woods Conference held in July 1944, at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the USA [4] . [17] . It is important to note that the same rationale that inspired the work on the founding of the UN to commence before the end of World War II also underpinned the founding of the Bretton Woods Institutions. It was thought that galvanising the international political will to address the economic and other problems that played contributing roles in the outbreak of World War II would be difficult once the war had ended and countries turned their attention to domestic reconstruction [18] . Consequently, the dominant Allied states in wartime automatically played varying degrees of dominance in the multilateral institutions created within that time frame [19] .
that today hold a large measure of economic power, were then enemy countries and thus not represented at Bretton Woods. France was still under German occupation; its government-in-exile played only a marginal role. The lessdeveloped countries played nothing like the part they play today in international economic conferences. The Soviet Union came only at the last minute and sat on the sidelines"

Membership of the IMF
From an initial 40, membership of the IMF has grown to 189 [20] . Any state that has autonomy over its own foreign policy can be a member of the IMF [21] . A prospective member must also accede to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF to become a member as this details the rights and responsibilities of membership. On accession to the IMF, a new member is supposed to pay a quota subscription. The quota subscription is money paid to the Fund which determines a member's voting rights and the amount a member can borrow or receive from the IMF on a periodic basis. This is known as the special drawing rights [22] . Member countries that contribute more in terms of their quota subscriptions are also entitled to borrow more under the special drawing rights [23] . In this sense, the IMF is akin to a credit union. The quota subscriptions constitute the primary source of the IMF's financial resources which it in turn lends to member states in times of difficulty [24] . The amount to be paid by each member as quota subscription is not voluntarily determined by the member based on how much money it wants to contribute to the Fund. The quota subscription of each member is broadly determined based on the member's economic size [25] . Hence members with relatively bigger economies and with higher economic performances are allocated bigger quota subscriptions which also determine the percentage weight of their votes. The quota subscriptions are not static as they are subjected to five yearly reviews and can either be adjusted upward or downward based on a member's current economic size [26] . 48 representing a member and an Alternate Governor [37] . The substantive or Principal Governors are entitled to vote while an Alternate Governor can only vote in the absence of his/her Principal Governor [38] . As the IMF organisational structure draws inspiration from that of a private company with shareholders, the annual meeting of the Board of Governors could be said to be akin to the annual general meeting of shareholders of a company. Pursuant to Article XII:2(d) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, a majority of Governors constituting, at least, two-thirds of the total voting power of the Fund form a quorum in any meeting of the Board of Governors. Article XII makes provision for a system where, on a specific question, votes can be cast by Governors without the Executive Board requesting the Board of Governors to meet [39] . Decisions like remuneration, benefits and election of Executive Directors can be made based on votes cast via mail [40] . Article XII:2(b) provides that: -The Board of Governors may delegate to the Executive Board authority to exercise any powers of the Board of Governors, except the powers conferred directly by this Agreement on the Board of Governors.‖ The powers delegated to the Executive Board thus falls within the domain of powers not directly or explicitly conferred on the Board of Governors by the Articles of Agreement. The directly conferred powers that cannot be delegated include those relating to approval of increases in members' quotas, special drawing right allocations, approval of accession of new members, decisions on compulsory withdrawal of members and amendments of the Funds' Articles of Agreement and By-Laws [41] . The Board of Governors also exercises the responsibility of electing or appointing the Executive Directors [42] . There are two committees -the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the Development Committee -that are constituted by Governors drawn from the 189 Board of Governors. Pursuant to Article XII:2(j), the Board of Governors of the Fund is empowered to create advisory committees. The IMFC came into being in 1999 by a Resolution of the Board of Governors to succeed the Interim Committee. It was established to be a permanent committee and it mirrors the constitution of the Executive Board in terms of country distribution and number [43] . The IMFC is thus made up of 24 Governors from member states and it -deals with unfolding events that may disrupt the global monetary and financial system‖ [44] . It is vested with monitoring and advisory roles. Its monitoring roles include scrutiny of global liquidity and resource transfer to developing countries while its advisory role relates to the provision of advice to the Board of Governors [45] . Proposals from the Executive Board with regards to amendment of the Articles of Agreement are considered by the IMFC [46] and it is also tasked with the responsibility of receiving and discussing reports from the Executive Board and the Managing Director on matters of critical importance to the global economy and the Fund [47] . Thus the general work of the IMFC feeds into its advisory service to the Board of Governors. Due to its status as an advisory body, the IMFC does not wield decision-making powers. It meets on a biannual basis normally during the spring and just before the annual meeting of the Board of Governors in September-October [48] . Despite its status as an advisory body, Alexander Mountford has observed that the IMFC is very influential [49] The important advisory role of the IMFC is crucial in the analysis of decisionmaking in the IMF. The only body in the IMF where all members are directly represented is the Board of Governors. In spite of the value of a member's weighted vote, there is an opportunity to use it directly at the level of the Board of Governors. The restricted membership of the IMFC and its significance in the Funds decision-making process means that even at the level of the Board of Governors, there could be a double diminution of the influence of weaker statesfirstly, their weakness is made apparent by the weighted voting system where the value of a member's vote is determined by its quota subscription and; secondly the restricted membership of the IMFC which, though an advisory committee, wields a lot of influence in the decision-making process. The Development Committee on the other hand is constituted of 25 Governors drawn from the Boards of Governors of the IMF and World Bank [51] . The ‗Development Committee' is the short name for the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries. The main rationale for its establishment is to advice the IMF and World Bank's Boards of Governors on key development issues in developing countries and the needed financial resources required to spur their economic development [52] . Like the IMFC, the Development Committee meets on a biannual basis. It is worthy of note that though the (current) membership of both the IMFC and the Development Committee is drawn from a broad spectrum of states from developing countries, transition economies and developed countries, the members of the G-8 -the USA, UK, Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, and Canadaare represented in these two committees [53] . ISSN [72] . Evidently, the idea that Executive Directors do not represent their appointers or electors cannot be sustained by the facts. Also, considering the fact that the aims and objectives of the IMF, as provided in the Articles of Agreement, are all economic in nature, one would expect that these economic objectives would constitute the central ethos of IMF decision-making [73] . Influence from the leading economies are however brought to bear on the decision-making process and the Executive Board becomes prone to making decisions based not on economic considerations alone but also on the political influences of the great economic powers of the IMF [74]. David Finch argues that if economic considerations formed the sole basis of Executive Board decisions, it would not be able to explain why the Fund continues to lend to certain countries that exhibit low levels of compliance with IMF conditionalities [75] . The conditionalities themselves are supposed to be based on economic considerations as they are thought to restructure economies in crisis [76] . Non-compliance would thus mean that the rationale for lending has been breached and as such subsequent lending would not have been forthcoming. Consequently, continuous lending in such circumstances may denote non-economic influences outside the Executive Board itself, and the countries with the clout to exert this [78] . It must be noted though that in spite of the varying weights of vote reflected in the composition of the Executive Board, the norm in decision-making is consensus. The practice of consensus does not however preclude a resort to voting as any Executive Director can request a formal vote to be taken [79] . Pursuant to Rule C-10 of the Rules and Regulations of the IMF, the Chairman of the Executive Board [80] is tasked with the responsibility of ascertaining -the sense of the meeting in lieu of a formal vote [81] . Judging ‗the sense of the meeting' of the Executive Board is an ascertainment of the consensus of the meeting [82] . The practice of consensus may help shore up the role of weaker states in Executive Board decision-making as it is apparent that a resort to formal voting would entrench their marginalized position due to the weighted vote system. However, achieving consensus would not mean that all the Executive Directors exercise equal leverage [83] as is formally the case in the WTO decision-making organs, for example. In the WTO, votes are not weighted so, in principle, every member's consent is required for consensus to work. Consequently, to talk about consensus decision-making in a body with weighted votes would be an exaggeration or over simplification of the reality. Consensus may be ‗exacted' by those with the largest votes as the rest of the membership (represented through their Executive Directors) would know all too well that if the matter is subjected to a vote, they would lose. For example, in the decisions that require 85 per cent majority [84] to pass, the US with 16.5 per cent of the weighted votes [85] singlehandedly wields a veto. Knowledge that a proposed policy would be objected to by the USA, would require amendment or bargaining in order to bring the US on board. In decisions that require 70 per cent majority [86] , the five countries with the largest weighted votes exercise a default veto if they act together as their combined votes account for 36 per cent of the total weighted votes [87] . [93] . The Managing Director and operating staff of the IMF do not represent members and are as such required to execute their duties entirely for the purposes of the Fund and no other authority [94] . Members are therefore charged to respect the international character of the functions discharged by the operating staff and in this respect refrain from any attempts to influence them in the discharge of their duties [95] . The overriding principle in the recruitment of the operating staff of the Fund is that of -securing the highest standards of efficiency and of technical competence‖ [96] . [98] . The Managing Director is obliged to report any breaches committed by a member in respect of the obligations they have assumed to the Executive Board, under the Fund's Articles of Agreement [99] . For example, pursuant to Article XXVI:2 of the Articles of Agreement, failure by a member to fulfil its obligations under the Agreement could result in a decision refusing the member in question from using the resources of the Fund. This is referred to as a declaration of ineligibility [100] . Persistence of the breach of obligations by the offending member could result in a suspension of its voting rights [101] . A report of the Managing Director regarding a member's breach of the Articles of Agreement can therefore result in action by the Executive Board.
Reflecting Decision-making in the international monetary fund: implications for sovereign equality of states
Conclusion: IMF Decision-Making and Sovereignty Equality of Sates
The decision-making system in the IMF raises some issues of democracy and sovereignty, especially with respect to the conditionalities attached loans given to States. The current system in the IMF where, mostly, some developed countries have become the creditors and developing countries the borrowers can provide some insight into the power dynamics in the Fund. In the IMF, policy prescriptions that have become known as the Washington Consensus feed into the conditionalities that are attached to loans [102] . John Williamson identified certain key policy areas around which consensus could be built by the important decisionmaking institutions in the US government and international financial institutions. 
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second implication can be seen as an opposite side of the first argument -states that accept conditionalities in the IMF do so as a legitimate expression of their sovereignty. It is an expression of state consent. The problem with the second argument is how to construe consent where there are no viable alternatives to choose from. If IMF loans are effectively indispensable to the countries that need them, then their consent to the conditionalities tied to the loans may be seen more as an exacted consent, and this would raise legitimate issues of sovereignty and equality. On the other hand it may be argued that the UN, for example, has enshrined the principle of sovereign equality its Charter [107] and yet has principal organs like the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council that have restricted membership. There is even weighted voting in the Security Council by dint of the operation of the veto power by the five permanent members. However, in an organ like the Economic and Social Council, there is a ‗rotational' system of electing new members after ‗old' members have completed serving their term. Consequently, every UN member has the opportunity to serve as a member. This preserves sovereign equality by ensuring equality of possible representation. What is perceived as a problem in the UN system is the permanent membership with its attendant veto powers in the Security Council. Though the issue of conditionalities in the IMF has engendered much criticism, it also raises some fundamental legitimate questions. For example, is it unrealistic for a bank to ensure that the loan it gives to a customer is used judiciously for the purpose for which the customer procured it? Supposing I apply for a mortgage from a bank, do I have the liberty to use the loan to purchase anything I fancy and justify my actions with the excuse that I am responsible for paying back the loan and so I should have the freedom to use it on whatever I like? Should the bank have a right to require me to take life insurance and property insurance as conditionalities for giving me the mortgage? If one considers the questions posed above, it is reasonable to see possible limitations on my freedom (sovereignty) as an individual if I should agree to the conditions set by the bank. However, it is also the price I have to pay for getting what I want from the bank. I have the choice of not taking the loan. This safeguards my freedoms. However, if I deem the loan to be of fundamental importance to my survival or development, then I should be prepared to trade some of my freedoms as conditionalities for accepting the loan from the bank. Thus, operationalising purist concepts like sovereign equality of States in an organization like the IMF presents problems of synergy between principles and actual practice or the ideal and the actual.
